Qualia and Consciousness February 23, 2009
Posted by njl4807 in Philosophy of mind.add a comment
During my presentation in class, I talked about how Dennett argues that qualia is a concept that is not useful and that there is no reason to discuss. I think that it is very important to make a distinction in order to take qualia from the concept that Dennett would argue is completely useless to turn it into a concept that can be useful for an understanding of neurological processes.
When do Humans Develop Consciousness?, Part 3: Self-Awareness February 22, 2009
Posted by ews8704 in Philosophy of biology, Philosophy of mind.3 comments
My 3rd grade teacher, Mrs. Wilkens, had us hatch baby chicks in the classroom as part of our biology curriculum. This has to have been one of my favorite memories of Mullan Road Elementary School: for weeks we 8-year olds waited restlessly as the eggs sat huddled inside the classroom incubator, and every week Mrs. Wilkens would explain how the baby chickens inside were growing.
I remember they all started hatching at once, right before P.E class. Unfortunately, one of the chicks “didn’t make it,” as Mrs. Wilkens said (later one of the boys in my class told me it was born with its intestines hanging out, although I don’t know whether that’s true.) Despite our loss, we were delighted to have a handful of our very own cheerful chicks for pets.
They were busy, these chicks, and they seemed to make decisions as a collective. They would interrupt our lessons by a sudden chorus of chirps, only to all plop down asleep a couple minutes later, their plump little bodies all snuggled up together.
Unfortunately chicks, despite their cuteness, can have a vicious streak (much like 8-year-olds, for that matter) . All of the chicks were born with black feathers, except for one, who was instead a perfect butter yellow color, like the Easter biddies on Hallmark cards. Sadly, the other chicks taunted this yellow one relentlessly. Mrs. Wilkens, worried that his siblings would peck the yellow one to death, eventually moved him to his own separate terrarium.
The yellow chick, unfortunately, became quite lonely all by himself, and soon our long division lessons were interrupted by the deep, somber chirps of a chick forgotten. Mrs. Wilken’s tried giving him a friend, a tiny stuffed panda bear, but it was just not the same.
Unable to bear his yelping any longer, Mrs. Wilken’s finally tried giving the chick a little mirror. It worked. He loved it. He would peck at it and brush against it and have whole conversations with just his reflection. We kept the chicks for a couple of weeks more, until we had to return them to the farm, and I don’t think that little yellow chick ever did catch on.
Searle’s Chinese Room Argument February 2, 2009
Posted by Kyle in Philosophy of mind.add a comment
Imagine you’re locked inside a room, isolated from the real world. In this room with you are a Chinese keyboard, a monitor, and a rule-book written in English that tells you what sequences of Chinese symbols you should send in response to certain sequences of Chinese symbols that appear on the monitor. It does not provide any word-translations, however. All the book has are syntactical rules for manipulating Chinese symbols. They say nothing about what the Chinese symbols mean or represent. Will you ever be able to learn Chinese while stuck in this room? Didn’t think so.
This is Searle’s proof that true artificial intelligence is impossible. Or is it?
At What Point in Development do Humans Become Conscious?, Part 1: Societal Ramifications January 26, 2009
Posted by ews8704 in Philosophy of biology, Philosophy of mind.4 comments
Societal Ramifications
The question of when we develop consciousness is, naturally, very loaded . If we are conscious in the womb, for instance, can abortion ever be moral? On my search for materials on nascent consciousness, I even ran across a book that insisted all expecting mothers should stay at home, lest they pass the toxic stress of the working world on through the placenta and trouble the fetus.
Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems January 23, 2009
Posted by Greg in Mathematics, Philosophy of mind.4 comments
Blah balha
–Evelyn Brister
I’d like to hit two main points in this blog post. First of all, I’d like to discuss Gödel‘s second incompleteness theorem a bit; second, I’d like to see if I can start an actual argument about the philosophical implications of these theorems.
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Introduction: At What Point do Humans Develop Consciousness? January 22, 2009
Posted by ews8704 in Philosophy of biology, Philosophy of mind.3 comments

Wired Baby
I first remember thinking about the nature of consciousness when I was 4 years old. Back then, I knew I was a big girl: my parents and teachers kept telling me so. I also knew that, before a girl is big, she is little. Yet I had no memory of being a little girl. (more…)
Zombies… Not Your Average Sleepwalker January 20, 2009
Posted by exk0730 in Philosophy of mind.6 comments
When I hear the word “zombie,” the first thing that comes to mind is a blood-covered, grunting, wobbling, decomposing corpse. Well I guess in magical lands and other universes, you could find one of these things. But there’s another connotation of “zombie.” The philosophical zombie. This type of zombie doesn’t grunt, and doesn’t wander around aimlessly trying to find some human to munch on. The p-zombie is a human, with some exceptions. It is physically indistinguishable from a human, yet it lacks conscious experiences, qualia, or sentience. When a p-zombie is poked in the eye, it will say “ow” and recoil, because it has the same behaviors as a human being, but it does not experience what that pain actually feels like. Zombie arguments tend to lend support for dualism by arguing against physicalist theories.
According to physicalism, all things can be explained by physical facts. If God created the world based on purely physical properties and laws governing the behavior of all things in that world, did God have to do something further to provide for human consciousness? If God did have to do something further, then it seems that physical properties must not explain everything there is about the world, suggesting that consciousness could not exist in a world of solely physical properties: a zombie world. It follows that if a zombie world is possible, physicalism is false.
The real question is: are zombies conceivable?



